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Abstract 
It was not until the 1990s that successful road user charging 
schemes emerged in Singapore, London and Stockholm.  The 
excuse was that ‘the technology is not yet proven’, plus the 
difficulty of making a lucid case to politicians, businesses and 
individual travellers that all would benefit from the 
introduction of road pricing in congested cities and arterial 
routes.  This paper shows that technology can now provide 
solutions to deliver innovative charging policies.  We review 
key schemes and trials, show what can be learnt from them 
and how the technical innovations and the evolution in policy 
thinking permit schemes that make road pricing acceptable 
and relevant to today’s congestion, energy, climate change 
and fiscal challenges.  Moreover, these innovations enable 
policy makers and road operators to offer a ‘new deal’ for 
road users where ownership and fuel taxes can be replaced by 
more effective “pay as you drive” (PAYD) schemes based on 
TDP (time, distance, place) charging. 
1 Introduction: technology is a policy enabler 
A Global view  
The development of the many policy variations for road user 
charging must be seen in the context of economic, social, 
technological and environmental policies of the last 50 years. 
Much has been written about the technologies underpinning 
road user charging but they are no more than enablers. As the 
underlying technologies evolve to record a vehicle’s presence  
on a route, its distance travelled or  other vehicle parameters, 
then so do road user charging policies. The world’s first 
electronic toll collection (ETC) scheme (Aalesund in 
Norway) emerged in late 1987 from the need to lower the cost 
of toll collection to enable the business case for a new road.  
Since then we have witnessed increasing congestion in cities, 
shortages of public funds to provide new road infrastructure, 
awareness of the damage caused by emissions from road 
transport and the emergence of customs unions on every 
continent that have stimulated growth in cross-border traffic.  
Other forces have accelerated the adoption of road user 
charging policies beyond traditional tolling; investor 
confidence in technology and operations means that multi-
lane free flow (MLFF) tolling can be applied routinely in 
developed countries; the advent of fuel efficient low emission 
vehicles has prompted reviews in the US and Europe of tax 
policy that, after 75 years, is becoming increasing strained.  
Also, inner city concerns about harmful vehicle emissions 
have ushered in low emission zones (LEZ), the largest 
covering 1,000 km2 of Greater London. LEZs represent one 
of the fastest growing road user charging policies in Europe, 
applicable to small areas also, as the Commune di Milano 
(Italy), only 8.5km2, highlights. There are over 50 European 
schemes. Technologies used include paper licenses, 
microwave Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) 
tags and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) 
cameras and the associated systems and business rules that 
convert charging events into payments for road use.  
The controversial nature of congestion charging has meant 
that the survival rate on the policy agenda remains low 
despite the fact that operationally it works very well. The 
widely different social and political contexts of London, 
Stockholm and Singapore demonstrate that congestion 
charging can be adapted successfully to a local context.  
Truck tolling schemes aim to ensure that traffic travelling on 
a country’s roads pays its fair share of the wear and tear of the 
road surface and other externalities that could not be 
recovered through fuel tax  or an annual domestic license fee.  
The New Zealand policy on Road User Charging for diesel 
vehicles was the followed by the Swiss, Austrian, German 
and Czech Republic schemes.  
In order to make better use of existing road space, congestion 
charging has emerged in cities, where road widening is not 
usually possible. On interurban routes, High Occupancy 
Vehicle (HOV) Lanes have been introduced; and where 
unused capacity remains, policy evolved to allow non-
compliant vehicles to pay to drive in these lanes - the High 
Occupancy & Toll (HOT) lanes – in the US [12].  
So, whilst charging policies have evolved from isolated toll 
roads to application in cities and strategic routes, the 
technologies that underpin them have also evolved, becoming 
more reliable and sophisticated. Standards at critical 
interfaces enable the apparent simplicity of interoperability; 
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to ensure that a vehicle owner is able to comply with the 
many and varied charging policies by the simplest means 
possible - as easy as roaming with a mobile phone.  
Today we see advanced charging and enforcement 
technologies collecting charges without toll plazas in 
Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, 
South Africa and the US, amongst many others. The 
implementation of congestion charging is not without the 
usual challenges of public and political acceptability.  
Recognising the barriers to implementation 
Whilst the road network is one of the few utilities that is 
(mostly) not charged at the point of use, fuel taxation has 
continued to fund the development and maintenance of roads, 
bridges and tunnels. New roads, funded through tolls, are 
often more acceptable, due to the direct, visible and local 
application of revenues. By comparison, the imposition of 
road pricing on existing routes requires a ‘leap of faith’ to 
accept future benefits; public transport enhancements and a 
reduction in journey time may not be valued by those paying 
the charges. Public and political acceptability is a prerequisite 
for a scheme but user compliance is also necessary to ensure 
its continued operation, According to Owen et al [22] 
acceptability may vary with time, peaking when there is 
sufficient support to enable a scheme to start, falling as details 
emerge and increasing again as the benefits become visible. 
Walker [27] shows that road pricing is acceptable if: 
• people who are  affected have experience that it works;  
• it is generally equitable –at least compared to alternatives;  
• it is revenue-neutral, or revenues are invested in transport; 
• it does not have a high cost overhead. 
On the last point, a 5% overhead seems to be achievable. This 
is much higher than the cost of collecting fuel duty (estimated 
at 0.2% of the total revenue); but fuel duty does not have 
traffic management or congestion reduction effects. 
 
Public education and public demonstration are necessary. 
2 What technology provides 
In this section we provide examples of innovation of road 
user charging to show what can be achieved. 
2.1 The London Congestion Charge 
The London congestion charge, included in the manifesto of 
the Mayor Ken Livingstone, went live on 17 February 2003 
with a charge of £5, raised to £8 in July 2005, and to £10 (12 
€ or $16) on 4 January 2011.  It is an area scheme (NOT a 
cordon) – vehicles must pay if they are used inside the zone, 
irrespective of whether they cross its boundary.  
The system is enforced by fixed cameras located at the 
boundary of the charging zone, supplemented by ‘screen-
lines’ of cameras inside the zone (Figure 2) which record the 
vehicle registration mark (VRM) using ANPR, and compare 
it to the declarations in the payment database. Users who do 
not pay are subject to a penalty charge of £120.  
When the scheme was introduced, congestion in the charging 
zone fell by 26%. Traffic entering the zone was 17% down, 
with chargeable vehicles down 31%. Bus patronage 
increased, and journey time and reliability improved. There 
was little change in the number of trips to the central area; 
50–60% of travellers switched to public transport, 20–30% 
diverted round the zone, the rest made other adaptations. Net 
revenues in 2005/06 were £122 million [6]. 
 
Figure 1: The Central London Congestion Charging Zone 
(Courtesy of Transport for London) 
Importantly, there was little extra traffic on the road bounding 
the charging zone. According to TfL [23], ‘Total vehicle 
kilometres on the Inner Ring Road are estimated to have 
increased by 4% overall’. When the Western Extension was 
implemented, traffic on its boundary route increased by 4%; 
on the ‘free passage route’ between the original Central Zone 
and the new Western Extension there was no change [24]. 
The benefits of the scheme, paid for by the revenue, included 
less congestion, more people using public transport, reduced 
road traffic emissions, and improved road safety.  
Public opinion was equivocal before the scheme’s 
introduction, but shifted in favour when it opened, with 
opposition levels falling. In 2007 the scheme was extended 
westwards, approximately doubling the area charged. 
However, a new Mayor, Boris Johnson, was elected in 2008 
with a manifesto commitment to consult on whether to keep 
the Western Extension, and after consultation it was abolished 
on 24 December 2010, though the Central Zone continues to 
operate. January 2011 saw the introduction of account-based 
charging (“Auto Pay”) to improve accessibility and make it 
easier for users to participate. This also avoids any possibility 
of a Penalty Charge Notice (PCN). 
2.2 The Stockholm Congestion Tax 
The political situation leading up to the implementation of the 
Congestion Tax in Stockholm is covered in Gullberg and 
Isaksson [15]. Road pricing was first suggested in 1978.  
After much debate and politicking, a large trial was held 
between January and July 2006.  
The trial scheme was cordon-based (Figure 3), with cameras 
on gantries at entry and exit points. The tax was charged for 
Swedish-registered vehicles entering or leaving Stockholm on 
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weekdays from 6 AM to 6.29 PM. Each trip cost SEK 10, 15 
or 20, depending on time of day, capped at SEK 60 (£6, 7€, 
US$9) per day per vehicle. The effects on vehicle traffic were 
remarkable. In January 2006 traffic dropped 28% [4,18] from 
450,000 vehicle passages per day to just over 300,000. The 
trial was terminated at the end of July 2006 but surprisingly, 
though traffic increased, it remained 5–10% below 2005 
values even though there was no congestion tax! 
 
Figure 2: Central London Congestion Charging Scheme – 
enforcement site. (Courtesy of Trevor Ellis Consulting Ltd) 
There was also no significant diversion onto other routes. On 
the Essingeleden and Södralänken bypasses, average daily 
traffic volumes increased by a few percent, mainly outside the 
rush hours [7]. Of commuter trips crossing the cordon, 24% 
‘disappeared’, but only 1% switched route to avoid the 
cordon; of the discretionary car trips, 22% disappeared, 
mainly by changing destinations and decreasing trip 
frequencies [4]. 
After a ‘Yes’ vote in the subsequent referendum, charges 
were reintroduced in August 2007, causing traffic levels to 
drop 21%, much as in the trial period. And the effect has 
increased over time; traffic is 24% less in 2009 than it would 
have been without the congestion tax [4].  
Public acceptability in Stockholm changed significantly 
before, during and after the trial. Surveys in spring 2004 and 
2005 showed 40% support for a congestion charging scheme, 
falling to 36% just before the trial, with 62% against. 
However, opinion then shifted dramatically. Support rose to 
52% during the trial, and in a referendum after the trial 53% 
of Stockholm citizens voted to reinstate the charging scheme. 
It was reintroduced permanently in August 2007 and in 
December 2007 support stood at 66%. In 2010 it stood at 74% 
[4,10,18]. 
Eliasson [8] and Borjesson et al. [4] comment that support for 
congestion charging is often positive when a scheme is 
proposed, but it decreases as details emerge; but when it is in 
place, support increases (‘familiarity breeds acceptability’) – 
especially as in Stockholm the positive effects on congestion 
and pollution were much larger than anticipated. Also people 
often find that the charges do not affect them as much as they 
expected. As Eliasson states, this has implications for the 
political process; elections or referenda should not be held 
when support for the scheme is lowest. In London, the 
mayoral election was held before the scheme details were 
worked out; in Stockholm, the charges had been in place for 
seven months; in both cases the electoral result was 
favourable. In contrast, in Edinburgh and Manchester the 
proposed scheme details had been published but neither had 
been implemented, and both schemes were rejected in local 
referenda. 
Figure 3: The Stockholm congestion charging scheme 
boundary. (Courtesy Swedish Transport Agency).  
Another noteworthy point is that extra buses were introduced 
in August 2005, but there was no effect on road traffic until 
January 2006 when the Congestion Tax came into operation. 
This suggests that provision of alternative travel modes such 
as improved public transport will not by itself get people out 
of their cars. This is consistent with [22].  
Thus Stockholm demonstrates convincingly that:  
• congestion charging works: congestion is much reduced;  
• traffic is not diverted onto other routes: drivers have 
alternatives other than diversion; 
• an initially sceptical public accepts (and votes for) 
congestion charging once it has experienced its effects; it is 
now a non-issue in Stockholm – even amongst politicians.  
It was suggested that the Stockholm scheme was expensive to 
run (50% of the revenue spent on collection of the tax), 
especially compared to Norwegian toll rings, which have 9–
10% overhead [1]. But as Hamilton [16] states, the 
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Norwegian toll rings are for revenue generation, and a 
reasonable efficiency measure is the revenue generated 
compared to system costs. But the primary objective in 
Stockholm was not to collect money, but to improve the 
traffic situation, so the relevant ratio is the social benefits of 
congestion reduction in relation to the costs. 
 
Figure 4: The Stockholm congestion tax gantries. (Courtesy 
Swedish Transport Agency; Photographer: Mikael Ullén) 
Transek [26] says that annual revenues were SEK 763M 
during the trial; annual running costs were SEK 220M. The 
capital and operating cost for the first year was SEK 2 billion. 
So it would take 3.5 years for net income to cover the 
investment cost, or 4 years in socioeconomic cost–benefit 
terms, both of which are short payback times compared to 
investments in road infrastructure or public transport, which 
have a repayment time of 15–25 years at best. The costs were 
high because it was a trial, and because of more public 
transport and park-and-ride facilities. The running costs fell to 
SEK 200 million in 2009, and were expected to be SEK 180 
million in 2010, so a comparable scheme could now be 
implemented at a much lower cost [16].  
Under Swedish law, transponder data was not a valid basis for 
a tax; a licence plate image was needed. Transponders were 
used in the trial, since the ANPR was initially only 60–70% 
accurate, whereas transponders are close to 100%. However, 
an intensive development effort by the contractor, and adding 
cameras at charging points to capture both front and rear 
number plates, improved the ANPR accuracy to well above 
90% for the trial system in January 2006. Subsequently it was 
improved still further so that with some manual support the 
accuracy was consistently 95–99%, and this was deemed 
adequate for system relaunch in August 2007. Consequently 
transponders are not currently used [8,16], though they may 
be introduced in future so that foreign vehicles can be 
charged.  
Plans are also being taken forward to implement congestion 
charging in the Swedish city of Gothenberg, with an expected 
go-live of 01 January 2013 [21]. 
2.3 The Singapore Electronic Road Pricing scheme 
This section is based on [5,13,14].  
 
Figure 5: A Singapore ERP gantry at Victoria Street. 
(Courtesy of Singapore Land Transport Authority) 
Singapore had a paper-based road pricing scheme (the Area 
Licensing Scheme ALS) from 1975. It was a useful traffic 
management measure, but was cumbersome, labour-intensive 
and inflexible, and was replaced by an automatic system, the 
Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) scheme, in 1995, using 2.45 
GHz DSRC technology. The contract was worth SGD 196 
million, of which half was for equipment for 60 overhead 
gantries (Figure 5), the other half for 1 million In-vehicle 
Units (IUs) (Figure 6).  The IU cost including installation was 
SGD 150, which was paid by the government for the 680,000 
initial vehicle owners. In 2004 the annual revenue was SGD 
80M, with running costs of SGD 16M.  
Because the scheme is for traffic management rather than to 
raise revenue, and to make it acceptable to motorists, annual 
road tax was reduced and there was a one-off rebate for each 
vehicle owner, so that overall the ERP was revenue-neutral. 
There were no cost–benefit assessments, although 
implementation and operational costs were minimised.  
Speeds on road sections are monitored and charges adjusted 
to deter or to encourage traffic depending on whether the road 
is congested, confirming that the scheme is for traffic 
management. There are always viable alternative routes or 
times of travel for drivers who do not wish to pay, and good 
public transport alternatives. 
In the 2008 revisions to the ERP pricing strategies, public 
transport capacity was increased, and 2008 vehicle taxes were 
reduced by SGD 110 million per year, which was higher than 
the expected SGD 70 million increase in ERP revenue. The 
cost of managing and maintaining the scheme has increased 
over time, consistent with the increased number of gantries 
and IU numbers, but remains at 20–30% of total revenue. 
The policy transition from ALS to ERP was small compared 
to the London scheme – this helped public acceptability, 
which was not a significant hurdle; public on-street trials by 
the 3 potential vendors helped ‘sell’ the idea. A potential 
upgrade to include GNSS is following a similar process.  
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Figure 6: Singapore’s new dual-mode in-vehicle unit with a 
CashCard. (Courtesy of Singapore Land Transport Authority). 
3 Lorry road user charging 
Lorry charging was first implemented in New Zealand in the 
1970s to tax diesel trucks based on distance travelled, 
followed by various European schemes (Switzerland, Austria, 
Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia). Different technology 
choices have been made: a hub odometer in New Zealand, a 
tachograph-based scheme in Switzerland, DSRC schemes in 
Austria and the first phase of the Czech Republic programme, 
GNSS plus DSRC in Germany, and GNSS in Slovakia. Felix 
[11], Walker, Pickford and Blythe [28] and Walker [27] have 
compared the costs of implementing various existing HGV 
charging schemes – though comparisons are difficult because 
it is not always clear whether all costs, especially enforcement 
costs, have been included. 
3.1 Switzerland 
The Swiss Heavy Vehicle distance-based charging system 
(LSVA), based on a modified tachograph but with DSRC and 
GNSS back-ups, began operation on 1 January 2001. 
Hofstetter  [17] and Walker [27] compare running costs, 
which are about 6% of revenues. 
 
3.2 Austria  
 
The Austrian lorry tolling scheme was reported on by 
Kollenhofer [20]. In 2006 the ratio of running costs to 
revenues was 11% (Table 1).  
 
Annual toll transactions 658m  
Toll gantries  450  
Total revenue  €825m  
Costs/revenue  11 %  
Kilometres charged 3.26bn  
OBUs (active contracts)  841,600  
OBUs actually used  533,400 (63%)  
Capture quota 99.7 %  
Toll evasion rate <1 % 
 Table 1: The Austrian lorry tolling scheme: key figures 
 
3.3 Germany  
Satellite-based charging has been used in the German 
motorway tolling scheme since 2005 [9,19], covering 12,500 
km of motorways, with over 650,000 lorries equipped in mid-
2008, generating €3.4 billion in revenues in 2007 and €4.4 
billion in 2009. Charging is based on motorway segment 
lengths, so it is not true TDP charging. 
The operating costs were expected to be 11–12% of toll 
income in 2009. There are also significant environmental 
benefits. By the end of 2009 the proportion of low-emission 
HGVs had increased dramatically. Vehicles in the low 
emission categories S5 and EEV14 accounted for less than 
1% of the toll mileage in 2005, but 55% by the fourth quarter 
of 2009. Over the same period, the mileage driven by lorries 
in the higher emission categories S0, S1 and S2 dropped from 
36.5% to 3.7% [2,25]. 
3.4 Slovakia 
Slovakia has used satellite-based charging since January 2010 
for lorries of over 3.5 tonnes. Again, it is not true TDP 
charging; it uses zones, making it simpler to implement. The 
toll road network includes 622 km of highways and 
expressways, and 1749 km of first class roads. Tolls apply to 
freight vehicles & buses over 3.5 tons. There are different toll 
rates depending on road type, vehicle category, number of 
axles and emission class. It is enforced by 46 control gantries, 
and 25 mobile vehicles, with 95 toll officers. Revenues were 
1418M€ and 1551 M€ in the first and second years of 
operation. In comparison the revenue in 2009 from the 
preceding vignette scheme was 42.5 M€. The efficiency of 
toll collection is almost 99% [3].  
GNSS technology was chosen because it is perceived to have 
advantages in charging on the dense road network, including 
maximising toll  revenue collection from lower category 
roads, and it could be implemented in a relatively short time - 
design, development and commissioning took 11 months. 
Implementation was also cost-efficient – a 4-year period for 
return on the investment.  There are also low operating costs – 
a microwave scheme would require 1098 toll gantries.  
The scheme was introduced because of the continuing 
increase of freight traffic on European roads (2.7% per year) 
while GDP stagnates or decreases. The scheme meets all the 
conditions of the European directive 2004/52/EC on 
“Interoperability of electronic toll collection systems in 
Europe“. The on-board unit integrates the 3 key technologies 
of GPS for positioning, GSM/GPRS for wide-area cellular 
communication and DSRC for short-range communication. It 
also provides a platform for introduction of new ITS services 
including systems for dynamic monitoring, management and 
regulation of road traffic, cash-less parking management, 
anti-collision and warning systems, vehicle positioning and 
navigation systems, obstacle warning and emergency call 
systems.   
4. Recognising the barriers to implementation 
Generally political and public acceptability present the most 
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prominent challenges (e.g. UK, South Africa, Chile, US).  
Technology is not a barrier. ANPR, DSRC and GNSS/CN are 
complementary, not competitive; they are mature and proven. 
But there are cost and performance issues; the choice of 
charging technology is important but is not the main capex 
cost. The process design, operational costs, and efficiencies 
due to interoperability are important, with fuel tax collection 
cost being used (unfairly) as a benchmark. We need to set 
expectations and deliver a solution that meets them. At the 
moment, the road pricing pioneers require politicians and 
public to take a leap of faith. We need to do a much better job 
of explaining to motorists why PAYD driving is necessary 
and inevitable – and is the only way they will get better 
driving conditions. We need to reinforce the concept of roads 
as a utility, paid for by users.  
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